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Individualism and Collectivism in Agreement-Making
under Australian Labour Law
Andrew Frazer
Introduction: compulsory arbitration, collective agreements 
and individual contracts 
Australia, in common with many other industrialised countries in the 1990s, has
experienced a shift towards individualism in labour law and labour market
regulation. This has been part of a wider change as governments have opened up
domestic markets to international competition, while rethinking the protections
provided by the welfare state. Business has demanded deregulation of all kinds
but particularly in the labour market, with the aim of achieving greater flexibility
and efficiency in the utilisation of labour.
The debate over the reform of industrial relations institutions and processes in
Australia has been conducted in terms of ‘enterprise bargaining’, a diffuse term
which means (depending on the position of the speaker) either collective
bargaining involving national unions but with outcomes tailored to specific
workplaces, or firm-specific bargaining by internal enterprise-based parties with
minimal involvement from ‘external’ bodies such as unions. During the last
decade the debate has moved from an assumption of collective bargaining with
union involvement, to the view that agreements should be primarily individual in
nature. Legislation has mirrored this debate, with increasing emphasis being given
to individual agreements. Hence the legal relationship between collective and
individual agreements is of major importance in contemporary Australian labour
law.
In order to understand any labour law system in a comparative context, it has
been said that one must adopt a functional and historical approach, paying regard
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to the values, history and culture of the country being explained.1 In the
Australian context, discussion of industrial relations is necessarily framed by the
long history of compulsory conciliation and arbitration systems. The shift towards
enterprise bargaining and individual agreements involves a fundamental change
in the traditional approach to industrial regulation under the Australian Federal
and State industrial relations systems.
Compulsory arbitration was developed in response to a series of ‘Great Strikes’
during the early 1890s. In these disputes employers responded to the growth of
trade union power by refusing to recognise unions or bargain with them. The
employers’ stance was supported by the common law which made collective
industrial action by employees a criminal offence or at the least a compensable
civil wrong. State-sponsored compulsory conciliation and arbitration was
introduced a century ago with the aim of preventing or settling such disputes. Its
primary aim was the encouragement of collective bargaining, either by making
agreements or by reaching conciliated (mediated) settlements.
The original aims of the Federal arbitration legislation were to prevent strikes and
lockouts, to provide for conciliation ‘with a view to amicable agreement between
the parties’ or, in default of that, to settle disputes by an ‘equitable award’ after
compulsory arbitration.2 The original framers of compulsory arbitration believed
that collective groups of employers and employees would naturally tend to settle
their differences by conciliation and agreement, and most likely on an industry-
wide basis. The very existence of formal and compulsory mechanisms for
conciliation and arbitration would induce parties ‘to make as between themselves
agreements in regard to the conduct of the particular trade or business in which
they are engaged. Then this Act will bind them.’3
The adoption of this system meant that unions did not need to gain recognition
from employers. Under compulsory arbitration, unions were recognised by the
state. As long as they were registered under the arbitration system they could
notify a dispute with an employer (or employer association) and thereby invoke
the compulsory processes of conciliation and arbitration. Ultimately a union could
seek to have the tribunal impose an award on the employer which gave the union
and its members both substantive and procedural rights. Registered unions were
also able to make enforceable collective agreements with employers.
1 Johannes Schregle, ‘Explaining Labour Law and Labour Relations to Foreigners: Some
Reflections about International Comparison’ in J.R. Bellace and M.G. Rood, eds, Labour Law at
the Crossroads: Changing Employment Relationships, The Hague, Kluwer, 1997, pp. 161, 163.
2 Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904, s. 2.
3 A. Deakin, Second Reading Speech, Conciliation and Arbitration Bill, Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates, vol. 15, 30 July 1903, p. 2861.
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The method chosen for making agreements legally enforceable was different from
that used in many other systems. Rather than treating collective agreements as
contracts, the arbitration system gave unions a special though limited legal status,
enabling them to enter into particular kinds of agreements regulated by statute
and supervised by tribunals separate from the ordinary courts.4 Thus awards and
agreements were not fully integrated into the legal system as occurred in many
European countries.5 Breach of an industrial agreement was not a breach of
contract entitling the innocent party to compensatory damages but, like breach of
an award, a contravention of a statutory obligation resulting in a penalty similar in
nature to a fine. In practice, though, it has also been common for parties to obtain
an injunctive order compelling the other party to observe the award or agreement.
The upshot of the particular historical circumstances in which the compulsory
arbitration system was developed, which determined the particular legal form for
bargaining and regulation, is that individual and collective labour agreements
have been quite different in their juridical nature and form. The contract of
employment, a creature of the common law, has remained notionally part of the
private law of contract (though resort to the civil courts in employment disputes
has been rare until recently). Collective agreements registered under the
arbitration system are part of the public law since they are regulated by statute
and (especially in recent times) their contents subject to approval by a tribunal
with responsibility to act in the public interest. Those collective agreements not
registered under this system remain unrecognised by the legal system and are
only enforceable by industrial action.
Different forms of regulation have accommodated periods of decentralised
collective bargaining across the twentieth century. Enterprise specific awards and
registered industrial agreements have been common means of recognising
bargaining within a centralised system controlled to varying degrees by the
Federal arbitration tribunal (now known as the Australian Industrial Relations
Commission). After the abandonment of the universal needs-based ‘basic wage’
concept in 1967 the Federal industrial relations system has in practice operated a
three-tier structure for wage fixation, involving national wage cases, industry
4 Andrew Frazer, ‘Australian Labour Relations: the Influence of Law and Government’ in Jim
Hagan and Andrew Wells, eds, Industrial Relations in Australia and Japan, Sydney, Allen &
Unwin, 1994, pp. 126–7.
5 See G. Bamber, E. Cordova and P. Sheldon, ‘Collective Bargaining’ in R. Blanpain and C. Engels,
eds, Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies, 6th rev edn,
The Hague, Kluwer, 1998, p. 407; John P. Windmuller, ‘Comparative Study of Methods and
Practices’ in John P. Windmuller, ed, Collective Bargaining in Industrialised Market Economies: A
Reappraisal, Geneva, ILO, 1987, p. 136.
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awards and agreements, and over-award agreements.6 In practice informal (and
legally unenforceable) over-award agreements determined the real wage rates in
many skilled trades and industries from the 1950s to the 1980s. Often collective
agreements were enshrined in consent awards made by the various tribunals, and
most awards were at least partly the result of negotiation.7 The result has been ‘a
peculiar hybrid of quasi-collective bargaining.’8
Awards continue to play an important role in determining employment
conditions, despite attempts by governments to promote decentralised collective
bargaining. Since enterprise bargaining was introduced in the early 1990s,
collective agreements have tended to supplement rather than replace the
traditional award system, relying on existing awards to set many terms while
providing ‘add-on’ conditions suited to particular workplace. Only 14 percent of
all employees covered by Federal certified agreements have their employment
terms comprehensively covered by them; the remainder continue to be regulated
by a combination of awards and agreements. However awards are being replaced
by agreements at an increasing rate.9
Although industrial relations legislation in Australia allows for legal recognition
of collective agreements through certification or registration under the arbitration
system, unregistered agreements remain common in practice. A survey in 1995
reported that unregistered agreements occurred in 40 percent of workplaces
which had a written collective agreement. Subsequent studies indicate that
unregistered agreements are more likely to exist at either small or very large
6 Braham Dabscheck, ‘The Arbitration System Since 1967’ in Stephen Bell and Brian Head, eds,
State, Economy and Public Policy in Australia, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 144,
147, quoting National Wage Case 1974 (1974) 157 CAR 293 at 301; see also Robert Macklin, Miles
Goodwin and Jim Docherty, ‘Workplace Bargaining Structures and Process in Australia’ in
David Peetz, Alison Preston and Jim Docherty, eds, Workplace Bargaining in the International
Context, Canberra, Department of Industrial Relations, 1992.
7 In the early 1970s, consent awards constituted around 70 percent of all Federal awards made,
and if certified agreements are added to the picture, non-arbitrated settlements constituted over
three-quarters of all settlements by award or agreement within the formal arbitration system at
this time: D. Yerbury, ‘Collective Negotiations, Wage Indexation and the Return to Arbitration’
in G.W. Ford, J.M. Hearn and R.D. Lansbury, eds, Australian Labour Relations: Readings, 3rd edn,
Melbourne, Macmillan, 1980, p. 464. It has been claimed that 25 percent of all Federal awards in
the late 1980s were entirely the product of collective negotiation, while most of the content of the
remainder was the result of agreement: W.B. Creighton, W.J. Ford and R.J. Mitchell, Labour Law:
Text and Materials, 2nd edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1993, p. 860.
8 D. Yerbury and J. E. Isaac, ‘Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in Australia,’ International
Labour Review, vol. 110, 1971, pp. 421–452; see Greg J. Bamber and Edward M. Davis, ‘Australia’
in Miriam Rothman, Dennis, R. Briscoe and Raoul C. D. Nacamulli, eds, Industrial Relations
Around the World, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1993, p. 18.
9 Department of Employment Workplace Relations and Small Business, Agreement making in
Australia under the Workplace Relations Act 2000 and 2001, Canberra, 2002, p. 105; Mark Wooden,
The Transformation of Australian Industrial Relations, Sydney, Federation Press, 2000, p. 42.
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establishments, and to supplement registered agreements or awards which
remained the main form of regulation. The incidence of unregistered collective
agreements actually seems to be increasing.10
I Collective labour agreements as one of the pillars of 
contemporary labour relations  
1. Democracy and collective labour agreements 
While there has been frequent debate concerning the need for a bill of rights in
Australia, the written constitutions of the Commonwealth of Australia and of the
constituent States are machinery documents which contain few recognised
individual rights. There is no constitutional charter of labour rights, or relevant
human rights. Australian common law (unwritten law made by courts) does not
recognise any right to associate for industrial purposes or to engage in collective
bargaining; indeed, many of the principles underlying contract and tort liability
are antithetical to collective action.11 In 1973 Australia ratified the core ILO
Conventions 87 and 98 on freedom of association and the right to organise and
bargain collectively (though it has not ratified Convention 154 on Collective
Bargaining). These labour standards do not have legally binding status in
Australian domestic law. However courts and tribunals have on occasion referred
to them in their decisions. The Industrial Relations Reform Act of 1993 increased the
impact of international standards on Australian labour law in the Federal
jurisdiction. One of the Act’s specific objects was ‘ensuring that labour standards
meet Australia’s international obligations.’12 Although international labour norms
were not directly enacted by the legislation, notions of collective bargaining
(including a limited right to strike) were introduced.
Many of these reforms were dismantled with the introduction of the Workplace
Relations Act in 1996, which does not rely on international labour standards. This
Act is designed to give equal weight to individual and collective bargaining, and
to reduce the rights of unions in negotiation and agreement-making. Since then
several attempts have been made by the current Federal government to pass
10 Department of Industrial Relations, Annual Report 1995: Enterprise Bargaining in Australia,
Canberra, AGPS, 1996, p. 25; Wooden, The Transformation of Australian Industrial Relations, op.
cit., p. 60-62; Richard Hall and Kristin van Brneveld, Working It Out? Why Employers Choose the
Agreements they Do – A Survey, Australian Centre for Industrial Relations Research and Training,
Working Paper 63, 2000, table 1, p. 23 (www.econ.usyd.edu.au/acirrt/pubs/wp.htm).
11 See Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law: An Introduction, 3rd edn, Sydney,
Federation Press, 2000, pp. 397, 402-408; Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v
Australian Federation of Air Pilots (1989) 95 ALR 211.
12 Industrial Relations Act 1988–93, s. 3(b)(ii).
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legislation which further limits the use of industrial action by unions in
negotiations for an agreement, and to restrict the use of industry-wide collective
bargaining.
Official recognition of collective bargaining has relied on the rights of registered
unions to make agreements or seek awards under the conciliation and arbitration
system. Because of this, the democratic foundations of collective bargaining in
Australia have been indirect. Firstly, collective bargaining has (to varying degrees
over time) operated under the conciliation and arbitration system. This system is
supervised by an independent quasi-judicial tribunal created under public statute
and subject to general control through legislation made by democratically elected
governments.13 Secondly, trade unions registered under the arbitration system are
subject to regulation by the tribunals to ensure their democratic control. Their
rules, management and elections are controlled to an unusually high degree.14
Under the traditional compulsory arbitration system, collective agreements were
formalised in a number of ways. An agreement could be submitted to the
industrial tribunal for certification, in which case it became binding on the parties
to it by statutory force. Until recently, certified agreements had the same legal
status as awards. Alternatively, an agreement could be presented to the tribunal
for adoption as a consent award. In both cases, the agreement or award had to be
approved by the tribunal, which was required to act in the public interest.15
Until recently, binding industrial agreements could only be made between an
employer (or employer association) and a registered union. Strictly speaking, the
agreement (like an award) was only binding on members of the union that was a
party to it. In the 1990s both the Federal and State jurisdictions have introduced
amendments extending enterprise bargaining to non-unionised workers by
allowing an employer to make an agreement with its employers, provided a
majority of them consent. However such an agreement remains a collective form
13 Andrew Frazer, ‘Parliament and the Industrial Power’ in Geoffrey Lindell and Robert Bennett,
eds, Parliament, Powers and Processes: The Vision in Hindsight, Sydney, Federation Press, 2001.
14 R.C. McCallum, ‘Federal Controls Upon Trade Unions: The Australian Enigma’ in D. Rawson
and C. Fisher, eds, Changing Industrial Law, Sydney, Croom Helm, 1984; Andrew Frazer, ‘Trade
Unions under Compulsory Arbitration and Enterprise Bargaining: An Historical Perspective’ in
Paul Ronfeldt and Ron McCallum, eds, Enterprise Bargaining, Trade Unions and the Law, Sydney,
Federation Press, 1995, pp. 56-60.
15 Industrial Relations Act 1988, ss. 90, 115(4); see Joseph E. Isaac and Ronald C. McCallum, ‘The
Neutral and Public Interests in Resolving Disputes in Australia’, Comparative Labor Law Journal,
vol. 13, 1992, p. 380-409; John Benson, Gerard Griffin and Graham Smith, ‘The Public Interest
and the Industrial Relations Act 1988’, Public Law Review, vol. 3, 1992, pp. 113-126.
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of regulation distinct from an individual contract. The agreement is binding on all
the employees concerned whether or not they agreed to it individually.16
In its Bell Bay Case of December 1994, the Australian Industrial Relations
Commission restated the tenet that the Australian industrial relations system is
founded on collective processes of dispute resolution and regulation, in which
trade unions play a primary role:
The establishment of conditions of employment at an enterprise level
through a system of individual contracts between a company and each of its
employees is one at variance with our system of industrial relations, a system
which, since its inception, has been based upon collective processes as the
means of providing terms and conditions of employment at the workplace.
The present [Industrial Relations] Act is based on a system of collective
regulation in which registered organisations of employers and employees
acting as parties principal are an integral part of the collective processes
which operate under the Act. 17
Since then the picture has changed dramatically. Now, under the Federal and
some State systems, the power and role of unions to engage in collective
bargaining have been diminished, while the position of individual agreement-
making has been elevated. The Federal Liberal-National Government, introducing
its 1996 reforms, explained that the aim was ‘to restore the focus of the system on
... employees and employers at the workplace and enterprise level.’ It was made
clear that the aim was to exclude the automatic involvement of unions in the
regulatory process, including the making of agreements. The Government said
that the legislation
does not discriminate in favour of one form of agreement over another —
collective or individual, union or non-union. These are matters for decision
by employers and employees, according to their own circumstances and their
own perception of how their interests are best served.18
Reflecting this apparent choice between individual and collective agreements, the
object of the Federal Workplace Relations Act 1996 is stated as being ‘to provide a
framework for cooperative workplace relations which promotes the economic
prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia’ by, among other means:
• ‘ensuring that the primary responsibility for determining matters affecting the
relationship between employers and employees rests with the employer and
employees at the workplace or enterprise level;
16 Workplace Relations Act 1996, s. 170M. Similar provisions exist under the NSW system: Industrial
Relations Act 1996, s. 31(5).
17 Re Aluminium Industry (Comalco Bell Bay Companies) Award 1983 (1994) 56 IR 403 at 442.
18 P. Reith, Second Reading Speech, House of Representatives Weekly Hansard, 23 May 1996, pp. 1295,
1300.
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• enabling employers and employees to choose the most appropriate form of
agreement for their particular circumstances, whether or not that form is
provided for by this Act; and
• providing the means for wages and conditions of employment to be
determined as far as possible by the agreement of employers and employees at
the workplace or enterprise level, upon a foundation of minimum standards.’19
The Labor Government had already introduced legislation in 1992-93 which
attempted to force parties into particular forms of bargaining. These changes
reduced the role of the Industrial Relations Commission as an independent
scrutineer acting in the public interest. Bargaining was now designed to be
focussed on the level of the particular enterprise or plant. The purpose of these
changes was to ‘entrench enterprise bargaining as the very hallmark of Australia’s
industrial system.’20 However the process was still highly regulated through
legislation and was intended by the government to remain collective in focus,
relying on the existing industry-based union structure. The union registration
system means that in practice only one union can cover an occupation. Since the
1980s unions have amalgamated into a small number of large industry-based
unions, which have generally been granted near-exclusive state recognition as the
collective bargaining parties in their industry.
This pattern of representation and bargaining has been diminished to a limited
extent by the statutory creation of a different ‘stream’ of non-union agreements
concluded between a corporate employer and the mass of employees at a
workplace. These non-union agreements were originally introduced by the Labor
government in 1993 as a means of extending enterprise bargaining to the
unorganised workforce. Such an agreement, drawn up by an employer and
approved by a majority of employees at a workplace, became binding on all
existing and future employees once it was certified by the Commission as
satisfying a number of statutory tests. This form of ‘collective’ agreement has been
given greater prominence by the Workplace Relations Act 1996.
Despite these legislative changes, however, unions remain strongly involved in
agreement-making. The vast majority of Federal certified agreements are made
between a corporate employer and a registered union. While agreements made
directly with employees have increased steadily since their introduction, they still
only account for 9 percent of employees covered by the Federal bargaining
19 Workplace Relations Act 1996, s. 3(b)–(d).
20 L. Brereton, Second Reading Speech, Industrial Relations Reform Bill, House of Representatives
Weekly Hansard, 28 October 1993, p. 2779.
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system. While the number of such agreements is increasing, they are covering
smaller numbers of workers on average.21
There is no mandatory process for bargaining under the Federal system. A
certified agreement must be approved by a valid majority of employees subject to
it (ie a simple majority of those actually voting). While the legislation
contemplates that approval may be by ballot, this is not mandatory. There are
several provisions designed to achieve informed consent in the approval process.
The employees must be given access to a copy of the agreement, and it must be
explained to the employees who will be subject to it. This must be done in a way
which takes account of their particular circumstances and needs. The legislation
specifically mentions women, persons from a non-English speaking background,
and young people as having special needs.22 Ultimately, the employees must have
‘genuinely approved’ the agreement. This requirement has been interpreted as
requiring genuine consent which was ‘informed and uncoerced.’23 The agreement
cannot be certified unless the Commission is satisfied that it was genuinely
approved.
There are legislative provisions which are supposed to protect free bargaining.
Persons are prohibited from using action, including industrial action, with the
intent to coerce another person to agree to the making or variation of a certified
agreement. Similar protections against coercion or harassment also exist under the
State systems.24 Once an agreement comes into operation, the ability of the parties
to engage in industrial action is limited. During the contemplated life of the
certified agreement (no more than three years), the parties must not engage in
industrial action in support of claims against the other party in respect of
employees covered by the agreement. Industrial action is defined very widely to
include any restriction on the normal performance of work. If the dominant
purpose of the industrial action is to pursue claims made or contemplated by a
party to the agreement, the action may be prohibited by an injunction of the
Federal Court.25
21 Department of Employment Workplace Relations and Small Business, Agreement making in
Australia under the Workplace Relations Act 1998 and 1999, Canberra, 2000, pp. 23, 25–6; Agreement
making in Australia under the Workplace Relations Act 2000 and 2001, Canberra, 2002, pp. 57-8.
22 Workplace Relations Act 1996, ss. 170LJ(3), 170LK(3), 170LR(2), 170LT(7).
23 Workplace Relations Act 1996, s. 170LT(5) – (6); Ian Ross and John Trew, Informed Consent in
Agreement Making under the Workplace Relations Act, Australian Centre for Industrial Relations
Research and Training, Working Paper 68, 2001, p. 6
(www.econ.usyd.edu.au/acirrt/pubs/wp.htm).
24 Workplace Relations Act 1996, s. 170NC. Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA), s. 225
makes it an offence to harass an employee or apply improper pressure to induce them to enter
into an enterprise agreement or the variation of one.
25 Workplace Relations Act 1996, s. 170MN.
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The 1996 amendments introduced a new form of individual statutory labour
agreement, the Australian Workplace Agreement (AWA). Such agreements were
originally intended to operate as a form of individual contract reproducing some
(though not necessarily all) the express terms of the contract of employment.
AWAs were given statutory form and recognition in order to allow individual
parties to override some of the terms of certified agreements made on a collective
basis. For the first time under the Federal system, therefore, individual agreements
were given statutory recognition. The government explained that the purpose of
introducing this kind of agreement was to promote flexibility and self-regulation
through individual agreements while retaining some regulatory protections (in
the form of minimum employment conditions and sanctions against illegitimate
bargaining tactics).26
An Australian Workplace Agreement is a written agreement made between an
employer and employee ‘that deals with matters pertaining to’ their employment
relationship. It may be made when there is an existing employment relationship,
as well as before the employment has commenced.27 There has been a steady
increase in the incidence of such agreements, although only about 13,000
employees (1.7 percent of the workforce) are covered by them. While they were
intended to benefit small employers in particular, four-fifths are made by
organisations with more than 100 employees, and they are increasingly used by
large employers, who have traditionally been covered by the award system. They
are most common in retail, transport, and service industries.28
Australian Workplace Agreements are subject to few legislative restrictions
concerning their contents. They must incorporate a procedure for resolving
disputes arising under them, and must include certain clauses prohibiting
discrimination. The terms of the AWA, as a total package, must not disadvantage
the employee by comparison with a relevant award.29 Before coming into effect,
they must be approved by an independent official, rather than by the industrial
relations tribunal, as is the case with collective agreements. Similar individual
agreements exist under the Queensland and Western Australian State systems. In
both States, however, recent amendments now require individual statutory
agreements to be approved by the industrial relations tribunal, and only after it
has satisfied a series of statutory safeguards to protect freedom of choice. In
26 P. Reith, Second Reading Speech, Workplace Relations Bill, House of Representatives Weekly
Hansard, 23 May 1996, p. 1300.
27 Workplace Relations Act 1996, s. 170VF.
28 Department of Employment Workplace Relations and Small Business, Agreement making in
Australia under the Workplace Relations Act 2000 and 2001, Canberra, 2002, pp. 150, 156.
29 Workplace Relations Act 1996, ss. 170VPB, 170VG & 170VPG.
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Western Australia an individual statutory agreement can no longer be made while
a statutory collective agreement continues to cover the employee concerned.30
The last decade has seen a substantial increase in the proportion of the workforce
covered by either collective or individual agreements, and a corresponding
decline in the importance of the award system. Currently about 44 percent of
employees are covered by awards, while 42 percent are paid under certified or
similar registered collective agreements and 14 percent are paid under individual
contracts or agreements (ie not covered by awards).31
2. Market economy and collective labour agreements 
The establishment of compulsory arbitration was closely associated with
protection of domestic industries from international competition by the use of
tariffs and bounties. The Federal Labor government (1983-96) dramatically
reversed this situation by opening up the Australian economy to greater
international competition in the mid-1980s, floating the Australian dollar,
deregulating the financial sector, winding back industry protection, restructuring
(and subsequently privatising) government monopolies and relaxing many
government controls. These changes were made in response to a perceived
economic crisis. By the mid-1980s Australia was facing a host of economic
problems: a declining balance of payments, depreciating currency, low productive
investment, persistently high inflation, and a worsening public deficit. An
unemployment rate of around 10 percent seemed to have become entrenched.
International market forces were seen to be demanding major structural reforms
to the economy, not least of which were fundamental changes to the labour
market and the regulation of industrial relations.
The demand for labour market reform was championed by proponents of
individualist neo-liberalism (in Australia described, often disparagingly, as
economic rationalists). They advanced a deregulationist approach as a means of
solving Australia’s economic problems by abolishing the ‘rigidities’ which were
thought to be impeding greater efficiency. The term ‘enterprise bargaining’ was
30 Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld), ss. 193, 203, 273; Labour Relations Reform Act 2002 (WA),
amending the Industrial Relations Act 1979. The recent Western Australian legislation phases out
the individual ‘workplace agreements’ introduced in 1993, but still allows for individual
‘employer-employee agreements’ which are similar in conception to (collective) industrial
agreements.
31 Department of Employment Workplace Relations and Small Business, Award and Agreement
Coverage Survey 1999, July 2000 (www.dewrsb.gov.au/workplacerelations/publications/
aacoverage). Of those covered by awards, half were paid at the award rate and half paid above
the award, including payment by unregistered agreement.
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used by employer groups, particularly the Business Council of Australia
(representing large employers), to advocate a shift in focus towards workplace-
based co-operation in achieving improvements to productivity. While enterprise
bargaining was originally assumed to be collective in nature, in later years
employers increasingly called for individual agreements to allow them to
completely ‘opt out’ of the existing award system.
In fact considerable flexibility had already been achieved in the award system by
the late 1980s. The Australian Industrial Relations Commission adopted a
succession of principles in its National Wage Cases from 1986 to 1989 which were
designed to achieve micro-economic reform at the workplace level. The principles
were directed towards improving training and skilling, promoting industrial
restructuring and efficiency, increasing flexibility in the use of labour, reducing
conflicts and promoting consultation. Awards were modernised and simplified.
Unions gained significant rights of consultation and participation in the
restructuring process. These principles assumed lesser significance with the shift
to enterprise bargaining, as the Commission could no longer scrutinise
agreements to ensure that they met national objectives. The shift to an enterprise
bargaining system has meant the end of codetermination and managed regulation
of industry policy.
3.  Collective labour agreements as an instrument of negotiated 
social policy  
Industrial relations has tended to be divorced from social policy in Australia, with
relatively little dialogue between industrial and social policy partners. This
separation has been reinforced by the highly institutionalised nature of industrial
relations, which has left industrial relations policy largely to be administered by
arbitration tribunals independent from government. Although one of the two
principal political parties, the Australian Labor Party (ALP), was originally
formed to advance the trade union movement’s goals politically and remains
closely linked to the union movement, the industrial and political wings of the
labour movement have remained separate in the formulation and implementation
of policy.
The clearest, and most unusual, case of the convergence of industrial and social
policy took place with the Accord between the ALP and the Australian Council of
Trade Unions (ACTU) which was signed in 1983. The original Accord was an
agreement on prices and incomes policy which was designed to maintain living
standards by improving national productivity. One of the chief means of
achieving these goals was through centralised regulation of wages by the
compulsory arbitration system. The new ALP government led by former ACTU
15
president Bob Hawke took power with the union movement’s commitment under
the Accord not to pursue extra pay claims beyond those linked to productivity, in
return for the government’s promises to reform taxation and social welfare. Over
the next few years, the government attempted to extend the Accord into a wide-
ranging social compact involving employer and business organisations, the social
services sector and community groups, through a series of summits and
consultations. The inclusive approach taken by the government was frequently
described as corporatist because of its attempt to ‘lock in’ non-government groups
to defending and policing government policies among their constituencies.
Successive versions of the Accord were negotiated in the wake of Australia’s
economic problems, notably a declining balance of payments and weakening
currency. The result, from 1987 onward, was a commitment to greater industrial
restructuring and efficiency, achieved by reformed negotiated at the enterprise
level by unions jointly operating as ‘single bargaining units’ at each workplace.
However outcomes continued to be scrutinised by the Industrial Relations
Commission. This was followed in the early 1990s by a willingness to reduce
centralised controls on the bargaining process by limiting the Commission’s role,
and to extend the bargaining process to workplaces without a strong union
presence by allowing the recognition of non-union collective agreements. The
Accord thus produced fundamental changes to collective bargaining: in the legal
framework and processes, as well as in the unions’ commitment to bargaining and
their expectations of outcomes.
This experiment in negotiated industrial and social policy ended with the election
of a conservative government in 1996. Since then the avenues for formal
consultation and dialogue have been dismantled.
4. Freedom to negotiate collective labour agreements as a principle 
of labour law 
The notions of freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively have
been present implicitly in the compulsory arbitration system’s prohibition of
victimisation against union members and the recognition of the right of unions to
participate in the making of agreements and awards. Yet the explicit recognition
of the principle of the right to bargain has only occurred with the adoption of
enterprise bargaining in the last decade.
The Industrial Relations Reform Act of 1993 recognised a right to bargain in two
ways: by creating a limited right to strike; and by introducing a notion of good
faith bargaining. Most of these provisions have been continued under the 1996
legislation. Industrial action was protected from legal liability under the common
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law in most cases when the industrial action was taken during the notified
‘bargaining period.’ In order to initiate a bargaining period, an employer or union
has to notify the other party of an intention to seek negotiations towards a
certified agreement. During this period a bargaining party may notify their
intention to engage in industrial action with 72 hours’ notice: once notified, the
intended action is protected from the industrial torts (which make virtually all
forms of industrial action unlawful at common law and subject to prohibition by
court orders under threat of a heavy fine).
Industrial action in support of bargaining is only protected if it was preceded by
genuine attempts to negotiate, and notice was given by the union or employer
involved. Once a certified agreement has been concluded, no industrial action is
permitted over items which are the subject of the agreement during the stated
period of its operation.32
The protected bargaining period may be terminated or suspended by the
Industrial Relations Commission if it finds that a party is not genuinely trying to
make an agreement.33 The Commission can also intervene to restrain the use of
industrial action in support of collective bargaining, by suspending or terminating
a bargaining period on public interest grounds.34 Once this occurs, the parties no
longer have legally immunity for their industrial action. The use of this power has
become relatively common in the last few years, with several strikes being
terminated. In many cases a union was engaging in strike or picketing action
because the employer refused to negotiate on a collective basis.
The 1993 reforms introduced the concept of good faith bargaining to an extent by
providing that the Industrial Relations Commission could make orders for the
purpose of ‘ensuring that the parties negotiating an agreement do so in good
faith.’35 Although the powers of the Commission to intervene appeared to be
extensive, the Commission itself held that its power was only facilitative: it could
only order parties to meet and confer, but could not enforce parties to engage in
32 Workplace Relations Act 1996, ss. 170MO, 170MP, 170MN. However, issues which were covered
by the agreement may be pursued by later industrial action: Emwest Products Pty Ltd v
Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing & Kindred Industries Union [2002] FCA 61.
33 Industrial Relations Act 1988–93, s. 170PO.
34 The bargaining period could be suspended if the industrial action threatened to endanger the
life, safety or welfare of the whole or part of the population, or threatened ‘to cause significant
damage to the Australian economy or an important part of it’: Industrial Relations Act 1988–93, s.
170PO; Workplace Relations Act 1996, s. 170MW(3). If the bargaining period is suspended for this
reason the Commission may proceed to arbitrate an award dealing with the matters directly at
issue.
35 Industrial Relations Act 1988–93, s. 170QK.
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good faith bargaining.36 This view was based on the Commission’s understanding
that to order a party to negotiate necessarily meant ordering that party to make
concessions, which was an unwarranted intrusion into the bargaining process. The
Commission’s power to supervise bargaining has been significantly reduced
under the 1996 amendments.
The Workplace Relations Act 1996 has made several changes to collective bargaining
rights. For the first time it has introduced provisions explicitly protecting freedom
of association (equally protecting the right to join a trade union and the right not
to join). Compulsory arbitration legislation has always contained provisions to
protect union members from victimisation or discrimination by employers. These
were extended in the 1996 Act to encompass discrimination on the grounds of
non-membership as well.
At the same time, the Act has deliberately reduced the power and role of unions in
the agreement-making process. The reduction of the role of unions in bargaining is
consonant with one of the aims of the Workplace Relations Act, which is to expand
possibilities for non-union and individual agreements. Under the previous
legislation, before a certified agreement could be approved, all relevant unions
were required to be given an opportunity to be a party to the agreement and the
Commission be satisfied that the agreement was in the interests of the employees
concerned.37 This requirement has not been repeated in the current legislation. It
now seems well-established that the 1996 Act ‘does not accord preference or
priority to one form of agreement over another.’38 Employers have therefore
tended to assume that the current Federal Act allows them to choose not only the
type of agreement they can make, but the parties with whom they wish to
negotiate.
The current Act allows an employer to make an agreement with one or more
organisations of employees, provided each such organisation has at least one
member employed at the workplace and is entitled (by its eligibility rule, which is
approved by the Commission) to represent the industrial interests of the
employees concerned. There is no requirement that every organisation with
36 Appeal by Public Sector Union (ABC Case) (1994) AILR 372, Print L4605; Asahi Diamond Industrial
Australia Pty Ltd v Automotive Food Metals and Engineering Union (1995) 59 IR 385 at 421–8, Print
L9800.
37 Industrial Relations Act 1988–93, s. 170MC(1)(g), (4). Otherwise, a certified agreement had to
include as parties all registered unions which were party to an award covering the workplace.
38 Australian Meat Industry Employes’ Union v Peerless Holdings Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1047 at para 20
per Finn J.
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members at the workplace must be included in an agreement (see also III.3
below).39
In trying to assert the right to bargain collectively, unions have tried to rely on the
freedom of association provisions of the Workplace Relations Act. Two provisions in
particular have been asserted as providing a right to bargain collectively. Firstly
there is a protection against discrimination on the ground that an employee is
covered by an award or agreement. Section 298K says that an employer must not
dismiss an employer, injure their employment or prejudicially alter their position
because (or partly because) the employee ‘is entitled to the benefit of an industrial
instrument.’ This section was given a wide application by the High Court in the
Patrick Case, so that the freedom of association protection includes less tangible
advantages such as job security, provided the change is real and substantial rather
than merely hypothetical.40 Thus an employer’s decision to make an agreement
with some but not all unions might be a violation of the freedom of association
provisions because it prejudicially alters the position of those employees who
belong to the excluded organisation.41 However section 298K does seem to require
that the injury by the employer be an intentional act directed to particular
individual employees. This requirement is sufficient to exclude many
management decisions involving a broad class of employees from the application
of the section, because it cannot be shown that the decision had a discriminatory
motivation.42
A second support for the right to bargain may be found in the protections against
victimisation on the basis of union membership. Section 298K prohibits prejudicial
treatment against an employee because they are an officer, delegate or member of
an industrial association (a trade union, whether registered or not). The same
section also prohibits prejudicial treatment on the basis of union non-membership.
In addition, section 298M prohibits an employer to induce an employee ‘whether
by threats or promises or otherwise’ to stop being an officer or member of an
industrial association.
It now seems clear that the freedom of association provisions protect only an
individual’s right to belong (or not belong) to a union; it does not extend to the
39 Workplace Relations Act 1996, s. 170LJ, also s. 170LO; In the Matter of CSL Enterprise Agreement
1999, AIRC, 5 June 2000, Print S6754 at para 17.
40 Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1 at 18; see
also Community and Public Sector Union v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2001] FCA 267 at paras 16–17;
107 FCR 93 at 100
41 Professional Officers’ Association (Victoria) v CSL Ltd [2001] FCA 628 at para 29.
42 BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union [2000] FCA 430 at para 35; 171 ALR 680 at 689;
see National Union of Workers v Qenos Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 178 at paras 118, 122.
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union’s right to bargain collectively as an incident of union membership.
Although there seems to be a strong correlation between an employer’s
encouragement of individual agreement and a decline in union membership at
particular workplaces, the Federal Court has declined to extend the freedom of
association provisions to situations where an employer favours individual over
collective agreements. In the recent BHP Case involving open-cut iron-ore mine
workers in the Pilbara region of Western Australia, the Federal Court held that the
offering of individual agreements with better employment conditions than the
collective agreement was not intended to induce employees to cease union
membership contrary to section 298M.43 The issue is a matter of proving intention.
If a union can show that by offering individual agreements, the employer
intended to induce employees to give up their union membership, a breach of the
freedom of association provisions will be established.44 This approach indicates a
narrow and restrictive interpretation of the protections afforded by the Act.45
However it is an approach which is consonant with the objects of the 1996
legislation and the intentions of its framers. Unlike its predecessor, which was
based on collective representation and the encouragement of unions, the current
Federal legislation is neutral on both these issues. But in adopting a neutral stance,
the legislation implicitly and effectively encourages both individualism and union
exclusion.
The Federal legislation also contains protections against illegitimate tactics in
relation to bargaining for an Australian Workplace Agreement. A person must not
use duress against an employer or employee in connection with an AWA. This has
been interpreted as indicating a legislative policy that such agreements ‘should be
negotiated and concluded openly and freely at arm’s length without outside
interference.’46 To threaten an existing employee with dismissal or to refuse to
deal with them unless they sign an AWA would be clear examples of duress in
this context. Likewise to threaten to reduce an employee’s hours of work unless
43 BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union [2000] FCA 430 at par 78; 171 ALR 680 at 700;
Australian Workers’ Union v BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 3 at paras 220, 240. Interestingly, the
State industrial tribunal subsequently made an enterprise-specific award to resolve this dispute.
The employer was required to respect the union’s bargaining rights: BHP Iron Ore Award,
Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission in Court Session, [2001] WAIRC 04082, 2
November 2001; further reasons [2002] WAIRC 05009, 13 March 2002.
44 Finance Sector Union v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2000] FCA 1372 at para 51.
45 Sarah Richardson, ‘Freedom of Association and the Meaning of Membership: An Analysis of the
BHP Cases’, Sydney Law Review, vol. 22, 2000, pp. 435–450; David Noakes and Andrew Cardell-
Ree, ‘Individual Contracts and the Freedom to Associate’, Australian Journal of Labour Law, vol.
14, 2001, p. 94.
46 Workplace Relations Act 1996, s. 170WH; Schanka v Employment National (Administration) Pty Ltd
[2000] FCA 202 para 24; 170 ALR 42 at 48.
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they signed an AWA would also contravene the section.47 Duress thus includes a
range of unconscionable conduct or illegitimate pressure.48 Although the Act
allows an employer to engage in a lockout to induce employees to sign AWAs
(provided the requirements for industrial action during an protected bargaining
period are complied with), this could amount to duress if combined with other
factors.49
In the Burnie Port Corporation Case, the judge held that for an employer to insist
that prospective employees be hired under an AWA did not by itself constitute
duress.50 An employer’s insistence that new employees sign an AWA does not
contravene the freedom of association provisions of the Act. These provisions
prohibit an employer from discriminating against an employer on the basis of the
employee’s entitlements under an award or agreement, but they do not cover the
employer’s insistence on a particular mode of industrial regulation for prospective
employees. The legislation gives the employer the right to choose under which
form of industrial regulation it will engage new employees. The appeal court
confirmed this view, saying that
The legislature has not expressed any preference in the Act in favour of one
form of industrial regulation over another. Rather, as is stated in s 3(c), one
of the principal objects of the Act is to enable employers and employees to
choose the most appropriate form of agreement for their particular
circumstances.
In the circumstances we are unable to discern any legislative policy or intent
that an employer be prevented from offering to a prospective employee one
form of industrial regulation under the Act rather than another. Put another
way, we do not discern a legislative policy or intent in respect of the anti-
discrimination provisions ... that it is the prospective employee, rather than
the employer, who is to be entitled to choose the mode of industrial
regulation under the Act that is to apply to his or her employment, where
more than one form of such regulation is available in the prospective
employer's workplace.51
The ILO’s Committee of Experts had previously concluded that the current
Federal legislation, by clearly giving primacy to individual relations, does not
47 Maritime Union of Australia v Geraldton Port Authority [1999] FCA 899 at para 368; ALHMWU v
Cranbourne RSL Sub–Branch Inc [1999] FCA 1425.
48 Australian Services Union v Electrix Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 211; Maritime Union of Australia v Burnie
Port Corporation Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1189; Schanka v Employment National (Administration) Pty Ltd
[2001] FCA 579.
49 AMIEU v O’Connor (2000) 179 ALR 25 at 41.
50 Maritime Union of Australia v Burnie Port Corporation Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1189 at paras 71–2. In
Schanka v Employment National (Administration) Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 579 an employer’s insistence
that existing employees sign AWAs was held to constitute duress unless the employees
continued to have ‘scope, in a real sense, to negotiate or bargain about entering an AWA or not.’
51 Burnie Port Corporation Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia [2000] FCA 1768 at paras 27–28.
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promote collective bargaining as required under Article 4 of Convention 98. Also,
in giving preference to enterprise-level bargaining, the Federal legislation does not
allow the parties to choose the level of bargaining. The Committee also decided
that the Western Australian system, by giving preference to individual
agreements, ‘does not create a system whereby collective bargaining is effectively
promoted.’52 This criticism has been used by the recently-elected Labor
government in Western Australia to support its legislative reforms, which are
designed to give primacy to collective bargaining. These reforms began to operate
in September 2002.53
II Legal mechanisms for shaping the content of the 
employment contract via collective agreement 
Because the compulsory arbitration system was installed as an alternative to the
existing common law, employment contracts and collective agreements remain
separate forms of legal regulation. Each operates without necessarily referring to
the other (although an award or industrial agreement presupposes the existence of
an employment relationship which is created by a contract of employment).
Whether the contents of a collective agreement are incorporated into an individual
employment agreement is a question of ordinary contract law.
Rights under collective instruments such as awards and certified agreements are
separate and distinct in nature from those contained in individual contracts of
employment.54 Until recently, collective agreements have enjoyed precisely the
same legal status as awards. An industrial agreement registered under one of the
industrial relations systems is not a contract but a creature of statute. As such, it
only has legal validity if it satisfies the statutory requirements, which usually
require certification or approval by an industrial tribunal. For example, the New
South Wales legislation makes it clear that an enterprise agreement ‘does not have
any effect’ unless it is approved by that State’s Industrial Relations Commission. A
certified agreement made under the Federal system ‘comes into operation when it
is certified,’ but not otherwise.55
52 International Labour Conference, 86th Session 1998, Report of the Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report III(1A), p. 223-4, 226; reiterated in
International Labour Conference, 88th Session 2000, Report of the Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report III(1A), p. 223.
53 Mr Kobelke, Western Australian Parliamentary Debates, 19 February 2002, p. 7512; Labour Relations
Reform Act 2002 (WA).
54 True v Amalgamated Collieries of WA Ltd (1939) 62 CLR 451 at 455 (Privy Council); Byrne v
Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 420.
55 Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW), s. 32; Workplace Relations Act 1996, s. 170LX.
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1. Normative Mechanism 
Normative clauses in collective agreements are those which set required contents
of individual employment contracts, operating as ‘substantive legislative
provisions’ which provide ‘standards of protection to individual employees.’
Contractual clauses create rights and duties for the bargaining parties.56
Normative regulation of the contents of employment contracts has not been a
feature of Australian labour law. In some areas of the law (eg trade practices and
consumer protection), legislation prescribes the minimum terms of certain
contracts. Such terms are regarded as being implied by statute into the contract.
However in labour law, legislation has supplemented the common law of
employment by creating obligations separate to those arising under the
employment contract.57 This is in accordance with the accepted notion that
employment conditions arising under statute, award or industrial agreement are
of a different nature to those deriving from the employment contract.
Certified agreements and Australian Workplace Agreements under the Federal
system are required by legislation to contain provisions dealing with a range of
matters, such as providing a procedure for dispute resolution.58 However these
remain terms of the certified agreement and are not incorporated into individual
employment contracts, even though individual employees may be entitled to
obtain benefits under the agreement.
In some jurisdictions the relevant industrial tribunal is empowered to review a
contract involving the performance of work if the contract is found to be unfair or
against the public interest. This power originated in New South Wales to prevent
the avoidance of award regulation by parties creating a non-employment
relationship (such as independent contractor).59 The power has grown since then
to embrace a wide range of situations involving injustice or unconscionability. The
tribunal has power to vary the contract, declare it wholly or partially void, make
consequential restitutionary orders, and issue orders to prevent the making of
56 See G. Bamber, E. Cordova and P. Sheldon, ‘Collective Bargaining’ in R. Blanpain and C. Engels,
eds, Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies, op. cit., p.
425.
57 Thus the employer is liable at common law for negligently caused injuries to the employee, but
workers compensation legislation, since its inception in New South Wales in 1926, creates
statutory liability in addition to the common law. Other statutory rights, such as annual and long
service leave, are similarly imposed directly by legislation rather than through the employment
contract.
58 Workplace Relations Act 1996, ss. 170LT(8); 170VG.
59 Industrial Arbitration Act 1940 (NSW), s. 88F (inserted 1959).
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future such contracts.60 The terms of a relevant award would be a major source for
determining what standards of fairness should be applied to the relationship. It is
not clear whether a collective agreement would also be considered in the same
way; unlike an award, it is not made in contemplation of the public interest. An
individual contract which violated the letter or spirit of a collective agreement
could be subject to review for unfairness, particularly if the employee were
induced to act to their detriment in reliance on the collective agreement, or if the
employer would otherwise benefit at the expense of the employee. The tribunal
would also be likely to give effect to the parties’ understanding of how an
individual agreement was supposed to operate.
If an agreement is registered, it gains force of law under the industrial relations
legislation, just like an award. This raises the possibility that the legislation might
alter the terms of an individual employment contract by directly incorporating the
terms of the award or agreement into the contract. In Australia, the issue has
arisen mostly in relation to awards, but the principle would be the same for other
industrial instruments, such as certified agreements.
In several decisions in the 1980s, courts held that a provision of an award had
become incorporated into an individual contract of employment, either by
becoming an implied term or by independent operation of law.61 For a time, this
notion was thought to create new individual rights and remedies, although the
development was criticised by academic writers as inconsistent with principles of
industrial and contract law. In Byrne v Australian Airlines the High Court
decisively rejected this approach and reasserted the separateness of awards and
contracts as forms of legal regulation. The court held that there was no basis for
saying that the award term had been ‘imported’ into the contract by operation of
the industrial statute.62 Thus an award or certified agreement cannot by itself
directly alter the contents of an individual employment contract.
60 Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW), ss. 106–107; Indusrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld), s. 276. Lesser
powers in relation to independent contractors only are given to the Federal Commission under
the Workplace Relations Act 1996, ss. 127A–127C.
61 Gregory v Philip Morris (1988) 80 ALR 455; Wheeler v Philip Morris (1989) 97 ALR 282; Bostik
Australia v Gorgevki (No 1) (1992) 36 FCR 20; 41 IR 452; see Gregory J Tolhurst, ‘Contractual
Confusion and Industrial Illusion: A Contract Law Perspective on Awards, Collective
Agreements and the Contract of Employment’, Australian Law Journal, vol. 66, 1992, pp. 706–711,
715; John de Meyrick, ‘The Interaction of Awards and Contracts’, Australian Journal of Labour
Law, vol. 8, 1995, pp. 11–23; Stuart Kollmorgen and Julian Riekert, ‘Social Policy and Judicial
Decision-making in Australian Employment Law’ in Richard Mitchell, ed, Redefining Labour Law,
Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, University of Melbourne, 1995, pp. 181–189.
62 Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 420–21 per Brennan CJ, Dawson J and
Toohey J; at 439 per McHugh and Gummow JJ.
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2. Contractual Mechanism 
Alternatively, the terms of a collective agreement might conceivably become part
of an individual employment contract through the operation of principles of
contract law. This might occur either by being express terms adopted explicitly by
the contracting parties, or else as terms implied into the contract in some way.
This could be the case whether or not the collective agreement was registered (or
certified) under an industrial law system. In England, Kahn-Freund took the view
that a collective agreement might be so well-accepted and acted upon in an
industry as to become implied into every employment contract as ‘crystallised
custom.’63 An extension of this idea, that an award could be implied by custom
into employment contracts, was rejected by the High Court in Byrne, precisely
because the award already operates independently by statutory force and so there
is no need for it to become part of the contract.64
In Byrne, the High Court also cast doubt on the possibility that the terms of an
award may become implied terms of the employment contract. The court applied
the conventional contract law test for implying terms. Hence award terms will
only become implied into the employment contract if they are ‘necessary for the
reasonable or effective operation’ of such a contract in the particular
circumstances.65 In most circumstances it will not be necessary to imply the award
into the contract for this reason, since the award already operates as an
independent form of legal obligation:
In a system of industrial regulation where some, but not all, of the incidents
of an employment relationship are determined by award, it is plainly
unnecessary that the contract of employment should provide for those
matters already covered by the award.... Neither from the point of view of
the employer nor the employee is there any need to convert those statutory
rights and obligations to contractual rights and obligations.66
The effect of Byrne is that if an industrial instrument has legal effect under statute
there is no need to imply its contents into individual contracts. Unless the parties
63 O. Kahn-Freund, ‘Legal Framework’ in A. Flanders and H.A. Clegg, eds, The System of Industrial
Relations in Great Britain, Oxford, Blackwell, 1954, p. 58; P. Davies and M.R. Freedland, Kahn-
Freund’s Labour and the Law, 3rd edn, London, Stevens, 1983, p. 282; cf K.W. Wedderburn, The
Worker and the Law, 3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, p. 332.
64 Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 429 per Brennan CJ, Dawson J and Toohey J;
at 440-41 per McHugh and Gummow JJ. The difficulties of establishing that the award
represented established custom, and that individual parties contracted on the basis of it, were
recognised in Turner v Australasian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation (1984) 55 ALR 635 at 638–
9.
65 Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 422, applying BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty
Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266 at 283; Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539 at 573.
66 Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 421 per Brennan CJ, Dawson J and Toohey J.
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expressly adopted its contents, an award or industrial agreement would remain
completely separate and distinct from the contract of employment.
Even unregistered collective agreements, which have no legal effect under
arbitration legislation, will not usually create legal relations of a contractual kind.
For example, in Ryan v Textile Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia67 the
Victorian Court of Appeal ruled that signed but unregistered agreements between
a union and an employer were unenforceable at law. The agreements, which
provided for redundancy benefits above those set by an award, were
overwhelmingly endorsed by general meetings of unionists at the workplace but
were never filed under either the Federal or State system. The claim that the
agreements could be enforced by individual unionists was unanimously rejected
by the Court. The terms of the agreements suggested that they were inherently
collective in nature. However, the unregistered redundancy agreements were not
legally binding contracts. The union had not provided valuable consideration, an
essential element for a binding contract at common law. The agreements also
failed to satisfy another requirement for a valid contract – the intention by both
parties to create binding legal relations. The court held that the redundancy
agreements were designed to have industrial rather than legal consequences and
so could not be enforced by the courts.68 The court made it clear that if the union
wanted to make a collective agreement that was justiciable by the courts, it should
either have registered the document under the relevant State or Federal system, or
else have insisted on transforming it into an ordinary contract.69
One issue not settled by Ryan is whether the terms of an unregistered collective
agreement may become implied terms of individual employment contracts. In
Byrne it was settled that an award will not ordinarily be implied into a contract,
but this was because the award has independent legal force. Since Ryan has
confirmed that an unregistered agreement has no legal force, it should be more
likely than an award to be considered part of an employment contract according
to the reasoning in Byrne, provided that the contents of the agreement are
necessary for the reasonable or effective operation of the employment contract.
While it is difficult to establish that the contents of an award or agreement should
be implied into an employment contract, it may be possible to show that the terms
67 [1996] 2 VR 235; (1996) 66 IR 258; see Andrew Frazer, ‘Major Tribunal Decisions in 1996’, Journal
of Industrial Relations, vol. 39, 1997, pp. 88–91; David Hildebrand, ‘The Legal Status of
Unregistered Collective Agreements’, Australian Journal of Labour Law, vol. 9, 1996, pp. 177–181.
68 [1996] 2 VR 235 at 273 , 251.
69 Justice Brooking’s analysis of American decisions on collective agreements suggests that he
would have treated a definite promise by the union as sufficient consideration, although he
might equally have declared the agreement void because he did not consider that the parties
intended to create legal relations: [1996] 2 VR 235 at 244–249.
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of a collective agreement have been expressly incorporated into the contract,
providing the contract reveals a mutual intention by the parties to be bound by the
collective agreement. There have been some decisions in recent years which have
held that the reference to an award or industrial agreement in a written
employment contract was sufficient to expressly incorporate its terms into the
contract.70 Because it is a matter of express contractual incorporation, it is
irrelevant whether the employee was a member of the union which negotiated the
industrial agreement: what matters is whether, on the facts, the parties intended
the terms of the agreement to be included in the employment contract. It is
possible for an employment contract to refer to an industrial instrument such as an
award or agreement without incorporating its contents into the contract. Merely to
refer to the award in an employment contract or other information is not sufficient
to incorporate it into the contract.71 Whether the award terms have become part of
the contract is a matter of determining the presumed intention of the individual
parties.
There seems to be an increasing willingness by judges to accept the express
contractual adoption of the terms of industrial instruments. In the most recent case
an unregistered collective agreement between an employer and a union was found
to have been incorporated into an employee’s contract of employment because it
had been included in the company’s policies and procedures manual.72 Because
the employee had agreed to abide by the terms of this manual, the agreement
became part of the employment contract.
The introduction of individual statutory agreements, such as Australian
Workplace Agreements, has complicated the picture. While such agreements are
statutory in their origin and effect, they differ from the hitherto existing forms of
industrial instrument, awards and certified agreements, which are collective in
nature. As agreements between determinate individuals, AWAs are like contracts.
A number of legal questions about such agreements are likely to arise in future,
questions which are not resolved by the legislation creating them and which are
difficult to answer by resort to traditional contract principles.
70 Honeyman v Nhill Hospital [1994] 1 VR 138; Ajax Cooke Ltd t/a Ajax Spurway Fasteners v Nugent
[1994] AILR 232
71 BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union [2000] FCA 430 at para 82, 85; 171 ALR 680 at
701.
72 Riverwood International Australia Pty Ltd v McCormick [2000] FCA 889. North J (at para 107) held
that the employee’s undertaking to abide by the company’s policies was made in response to the
company’s offer to abide by the Manual, while Mansfield J (at para 151) considered that the
contents of the Manual were ‘entirely apt to be treated as expressing mutually enforceable
obligations; they are clear, precise, direct and mainly deal with maters which one might expect
to be encompassed within a particular employment contract.’
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3. Replacement of terms of the contract of employment by provisions 
of a collective agreement 
The foregoing analysis shows that it is very unlikely under Australian law that a
collective agreement could directly alter the terms of individual employment
contract unless the individual contracting parties expressly agree. Where the
employment contract expressly incorporates the terms of a certified agreement,
the contents of the contract may change when the agreement is varied, provided
that the contract states that the agreement applies as varied from time to time.
The nature of both awards and certified agreements as statutory in force and effect
means that it is always possible for them to override existing terms of individual
employment contracts. However an AWA or similar individual statutory
agreement is immune to change by a collective agreement. An AWA excludes the
operation of an award or agreement made under a State system, as well as Federal
certified agreements made after the AWA comes into effect, and overrides most
other State laws.73
An unusual situation arose in the relationship between workplace agreements and
employment contracts under the Western Australian system. When individual
statutory workplace agreements were introduced in that State in 1993, it was
contemplated that registered individual workplace agreements could be a statute-
endorsed replacement for employment contracts. While an individual or collective
agreement did not displace the contract of employment, it had legal effect as if it
formed part of the contract and in spite of any contractual term. This meant that a
workplace agreement with a group of employees could not only override an
individual contract but could furnish terms to that contract regardless of the
intentions of the individual parties. Amendments made in 2002 replaced this
workplace agreements scheme with one which reinstates the traditional primacy
of collective agreements and awards. However individual statutory agreements
can still be made and, once their term expires, their contents become part of the
employment contract. The new arrangements thus continue to give contractual
status to individual statutory agreements.74
73 Workplace Relations Act 1996, ss. 170VQ, 170VR.
74 Industrial Relations Act 1979, s. 97UT, as amended by Labour Relations Reform Act 2002 (WA).
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III Factors determining the regulatory power of collective 
labour agreements towards the employment contract  
1. Collective agreements and deregulation 
In the Australian context, collective agreements have traditionally been concluded
within a highly regulated framework supervised by arbitration tribunals with
power to veto bargaining outcomes. The formal adoption of enterprise bargaining
by legislation in the 1990s has been a means of creating a more decentralised and
deregulated system by moving away from the principal form of state regulation,
that of awards. This has been undertaken by allowing certified agreements to
derogate from particular award conditions, provided that the terms of the
agreement satisfied a ‘no disadvantage’ test by comparison with the award.
As we have seen, the increasing adoption of collective bargaining under the rubric
of enterprise bargaining has been part of a wider deregulatory strategy
undertaken by both social-democratic (Labor) and conservative (Liberal-National)
governments, though for different purposes. In the case of Labor, it was assumed
that deregulation of bargaining would maintain the power and gains of unions as
parties in collective bargaining. Here the process has been aptly described as one
of ‘managed decentralism’ followed by ‘co-ordinated flexibility’ rather than full
deregulation.75 For conservative governments, deregulation has been part of the
ideologically-driven adoption of contract and market mechanisms, involving
greater resort to individual bargaining and the reduction of union power. This
approach involves a faith in ‘contractualist regulation’, rather than complete
abandonment of regulatory mechanisms.76
When the Federal legislation was reformed in 1988 as the Industrial Relations Act, it
contained explicit recognition of collective bargaining in the form of certified
agreements and consent awards. However the Industrial Relations Commission
could refuse to certify an agreement if it was considered to be contrary to the
public interest test. While agreements were not required to conform to the
Commission’s wage-fixing principles and standard award conditions, any
inconsistencies were scrutinised closely and the Commission exercised a high level
of discretion.77 The public interest requirement became regarded as excessively
75 Edward M. Davis and Russell D. Lansbury, ‘Employment Relations in Australia’, in Greg J.
Bamber and Russell D. Lansbury, eds, International and Comparative Employment Relations: A
Study of Industrialised Market Economies, revised edn, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1998, pp. 135-7.
76 Braham Dabscheck, ‘”A felt need for increased efficiency”: Industrial relations at the end of the
milennium’, Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources, vol. 39, 2001, p. 5.
77 Industrial Relations Act 1988, ss. 112, 115(4); February 1989 Review (1989) 27 IR 196; National Wage
Case, October 1991 (1991) 39 IR 127.
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restrictive by critics of the arbitration system, adding to the demand for further
deregulation (see I.2 above).
The leadership of the trade union movement originally supported enterprise
bargaining in 1991 because the centralised wage-fixing system was producing
unsatisfactory results.78 By moving to workplace-specific bargaining it was
thought that favourable wage outcomes could be achieved while still remaining
within the Accord parameters by continuing to link wage gains to productivity
increases. The shift to enterprise bargaining thus involved decentralization of
labour regulation combined with partial deregulation.
The requirements for certification of agreements were reduced under legislation
passed in 1992 and 1993. Agreements confined to a single enterprise were now
required to contain certain provisions and to meet a ‘no disadvantage’ test. The
test could be satisfied even if the agreement undercut award conditions, provided
the Commission considered that the agreement as a whole was not contrary to the
public interest. The continuation of a public interest component (though in an
attenuated form) still allowed the Commission to consider community standards
in deciding whether to approve agreements.79
The Commission’s discretion to veto agreements was criticised by key business
groups as creating unnecessary restrictions on the parties’ flexibility in bargaining.
The 1996 legislation has further deregulated the requirements for certification of
agreements. Now an agreement must be certified by the Commission so long as it
does not result ‘on balance, in a reduction in the overall terms and conditions of
employment’ provided by the relevant award.80 This allows parties to ‘trade off’
award conditions provided that employees are not worse off overall. The public
interest component of the test has been completely removed, reducing
considerably the Commission’s independent discretion. The same test must be met
by individual Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs).
2.  Statutory limits of the scope of collective labour agreements  
There are very few matters which are prevented from being included in certified
or registered agreements. Agreements cannot discriminate on various grounds,
78 Braham Dabscheck, The Struggle for Australian Industrial Relations, Melbourne, Oxford U.P., 1995,
ch. 3; Chris Briggs, ‘Australian Exceptionalism: The Role of Trade Unions in the Emergence of
Enterprise Bargaining’, Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 43, 2001, pp. 27-43.
79 Industrial Relations Act 1988-92, s. 134E(2); Industrial Relations Act 1988-93, s. 170MC(2);
Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v Tweed Valley Fruit
Processors (1995) 61 IR 212 at 232.
80 Workplace Relations Act 1996, s. 170XA(2).
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such as race, sex, disability etc. A certified agreement under the Federal system
cannot breach the freedom of association provisions of the Act, which prohibits
compulsory union membership or preference to unionists. As the result of unions
obtaining agreements which included union preference, an amendment was
included in 1997 stating that the Commission must not register any agreement
which permits conduct in contravention of the freedom of association provisions.81
Other than these restrictions, a Federal certified agreement must be ‘about matters
pertaining to the relationship between’ an employer and its employees. For
constitutional reasons, a similar requirement has long existed in relation to Federal
awards; it has been interpreted as limiting awards to ‘industrial matters’ which
would, for example, exclude political or social issues which are not directly
industrial. Matters which are only consequentially industrial, such as shop closing
hours or the deduction of union membership dues, would be excluded.82 This
requirement might also exclude matters which are purely collective in nature and
do not directly affect the relationship of employer and employee as such. The most
recent controversy over this requirement has involved demands by unions that
employers should deduct ‘bargaining fees’ from the pay of non-members to cover
the union’s costs of negotiating and obtaining a certified agreement, which
benefits both unionists and non-unionists. At the time of writing there was
considerable disagreement over whether such a demand is sufficiently connected
to the employer-employee relationship to enable it to be included in an
agreement.83
All employees are capable of being covered by certified industrial agreements. All
employees may also join and form trade unions which, by being registered under
81 Workplace Relations Act 1996, s. 170LU(2A).
82 Workplace Relations Act 1996, s. 170LI; on the constitutional restriction see Creighton and Stewart,
Labour Law: An Introduction, op. cit., pp. 76-81. While employee working hours are an industrial
matter, shop trading times (which may involve the proprietor working alone) do not affect the
employment relationship sufficiently directly: R v Kelly; ex parte Victoria (1950) 81 CLR 64 at 84. It
has traditionally been held that the deduction of union dues is a matter of debtor and creditor
rather than employer and employee: R v Portus; ex parte ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1972) 127 CLR
353; Re Alcan Australia Ltd; ex parte Federation of Industrial, Manufacturing and Engineering
Employees (1994) 181 CLR 86.
83 In some cases the Industrial Relations Commission held that an agreement containing a
‘bargaining agent’ clause was capable of certification: National Union of Workers; re Atlas Steels
Metals Distribution Certified Agreement 2001-2003, Australian Industrial Relations Commission,
Full Bench, PR917092, 29 April 2002. But a different conclusion has been reached in decisions by
single members of the Commission: Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information,
Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia; re SGM Electrical Pty Ltd, Australian
Industrial Relations Commission, Hamilton DP, PR921937, 30 August 2002. The Federal Court
has held that a demand for a ‘bargaining agent’ clause can be the subject of protected industrial
action as part of the negotiation process: Australian Metal Workers Union v Electrolux Home
Products Pty Ltd [2002] FCAFC 199. At the time of writing this decision was on appeal to the
High Court of Australia.
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the various arbitration systems, may participate in the making of awards and
agreements. The arbitration system has always been premissed on the relationship
of employer and employee as defined under the common law. This is a
constitutional requirement for the Federal system, and is reproduced in the State
legislation. The courts in Australia use a multi-factor test for determining whether
a worker is an employee. The worker’s subjection to the control of the supposed
employer is a key though not deciding factor, and a range of indicia are taken into
account.84 In recent years the courts seem more willing to rely on whether the
worker was in reality engaged in a business on their own account, such that they
bore the risks of profit and loss. The most recent decision of the High Court on the
question asked whether the workers were ‘running their own enterprise’ among
other factors. The court emphasised both the economic and organisational
subordination of the workers, as well as their subjection to control, as indicative of
an employer-employee relationship.85
By definition, independent contractors are excluded from agreements and awards,
since they are not employees. Contractors have been a growing part of the
workforce in the last decade, and now comprise 4-5 percent of the workforce.86
The ability of parties to re-cast their employment relationship into an independent
contractor one is an effective means of ‘contracting out’ of obligations under an
award or certified agreement. The tests used by the courts provide some limits to
this mechanism.
Apart from contractors, the only significant group of workers who are excluded
from the formal collective bargaining processes are members of the defence forces,
who are not employees. Armed forces personnel may however join unregistered
industrial associations which make submissions to the Defence Force
Remuneration Tribunal.87
3.  Exclusion of some employees’ groups from a collective labour 
agreement as stipulated by its parties 
The current system of enterprise bargaining is designed to produce agreements
which cover a whole business or undertaking rather than being restricted to
84 Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16.
85 Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 44 at paras 47–50; 181 ALR 263 at 277.
86 Audrey Vandenheuvel and Mark Wooden, ‘Self-Employed Contractors in Australia: How Many
and Who Are They?’, Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 37, 1995, p. 272; Alison Morehead et al,
Changes at Work: The 1995 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, Melbourne, Longman,
1997, p. 46.
87 Australia’s Report under the International Covnant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1990-1997,
Art. 8 (www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/reports/icescr.html).
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specific occupations. Agreements are normally supposed to apply across a whole
enterprise. Under both Federal and most State systems an agreement cannot be
made with only part of a business unless the part is geographically or
operationally distinct. Even then, the Commission must be satisfied that
separation of part of the business is reasonable, considering the work performed
by the employees and the relationships between the part to be covered and the
rest of the business.88 There must be clear characteristics which distinguish the
part of the business from the remainder, justifying coverage under a separate
agreement. Certification of the agreement must be refused if exclusion of some
employees from coverage under the agreement is unfair in all the circumstances. It
would, for example, be unfair to subject employees to different agreements if
historically they have been regulated by the same award and the same
occupational classification structure.89 Agreements made between an employer
and a registered union under Division 3 of the Federal Act may be limited to
members of the particular union.90
When making a union-based agreement, the employer is not bound to include all
relevant unions as parties. The Federal Workplace Relations Act 1996 says that when
negotiating an agreement, employers must not discriminate between employees
because some of them are members of a particular union, or are members of a
different union than other employees. It has been thought that an employer’s
refusal to negotiate with a particular union does not contravene either this
requirement or the freedom of association provisions of the Act.91 One judge,
while not precluding the possibility that the Act could be contravened by selective
negotiation, said that ‘it is the rights of employees rather than unions themselves
that the Act principally sets out in the relevant provisions to protect.’92 In one
88 Workplace Relations Act 1996, ss. 170LB(3), 170LU(8); Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW), s. 35(2);
Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) s. 157(5); Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA), s.
79(3). A collective agreement under the Western Australian system may be made with only some
of the employees at a workplace; there is no requirement that they be a distinct part of the
business: Workplace Agreements Act 1993 (WA), s. 9.
89 Appeal by Council of Holmesglen Institute of TAFE (1998) 83 IR 172. Coverage by the same award
indicates that the employees have an occupational community of interest. However managerial
employees may be covered by a separate agreement if they are organisationally distinct: Re
Australian Taxation Office (Executive Level 2) Certified Agreement 1998, AIRC Print R0953, 22
January 1999 (1999) 45 AILR 4-025.
90 Only members of the signatory union are bound by such an agreement: Workplace Relations Act
1996, s. 170MA; Re National Tertiary Education Industry Union; ex parte Quickenden (1996) 140 ALR
385. However an agreement limited to union members could contravene the freedom of
association provisions of the Act: see ss. 170LU(2A), 298L(1)(a).
91 Workplace Relations Act 1996, s. 170NB; Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v CSR Ltd
t/as CSR Humes [2000] FCA 1203 at para 54.
92 National Tertiary Education Union v University of Technology, Sydney [2000] FCA 874 at para 17 per
Madgwick J.
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recent case, where an employer excluded a small breakaway union from
negotiations with five other unions, it was held that this exclusion could constitute
discrimination between members of different unions in the making of the
agreement, contrary to the Act.93
4. Extension of a collective labour agreement by a public authority  
Unlike many European systems, there is no specific provision for extending the
coverage of a collective agreement beyond the parties to it. Indeed, the
introduction of enterprise bargaining was intended to prevent ‘flow on’ of benefits
from one workplace to another. The impact of bargained terms is supposed to be
limited to the enterprise. Hence the Federal arbitration tribunal is generally
prohibited from including terms in an award that are based on a certified
agreement.94
In the several State jurisdictions it is possible for the terms of an award (including
a consent award embodying a collective agreement) to be made a common rule for
all employees in a particular industry. In some States common rules are the
normal type of award issued.95 A common rule has force as an award, not as the
term of a contract. It often happens that the terms of an agreement are adopted in
an award which is made a common rule, but the extension to employees not
involved in the original dispute is the result of the statutory legal effect of the
award, not the agreement.
5. Limits imposed on a lower level collective labour agreement by a 
high level collective agreement  
The Australian systems have no formal hierarchy of national, regional, industry
and workplace agreements. If anything, enterprise-level agreements tend to
override ones made at the industry level. Also, since the demise of the Federal
Labor government in 1996 there is no longer a national social compact such as the
Accord voluntarily restricting union demands.
93 Professional Officers’ Association (Victoria) v CSL Ltd [2001] FCA 628 at para 24.
94 Workplace Relations Act 1996, s. 95.
95 Under the Western Australian system, an industrial award applies athroughouth the industry
and across the State unless otherwise stated: Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA), s. 37. In New
South Wales an award ‘is binding on all empoyees and employers to which it relates’, and an
award applying to a particular industry is ‘taken to bind all employees and employers engaged
in the industry’: Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW), s. 12.
34
Given that the focus of the new Federal regime is on encouraging enterprise-based
bargaining, multi-employer agreements have been tightly circumscribed. While a
number of employers may separately enter into the one agreement, such
agreements have to be independently approved by each employer and a majority
of employees at each workplace. In order to be approved, a multiple business
agreement must be declared to be in the public interest by a full bench of the
Commission. There are currently only 14 of these, covering 12,700 employees.96
Industry-wide agreements are no longer recognised as such under the Federal
legislation, although attempts at industry bargaining have been made through
bargaining strategies. The use of ‘pattern-bargaining’ by some powerful unions,
particularly in manufacturing and construction, has resulted in a large number of
agreements which are virtually identical in their terms; but overall such
agreements only cover less than five percent of the workforce.97 In other
industries, unions have sought to achieve national industry-wide ‘framework
agreements’ with employer associations to regulate the scope and timing of
bargaining.
In practice many industries have operated under a series of agreements made at
different levels. Most awards have been the result of agreement between collective
parties at the industry level over many matters, with arbitration over the
remaining unsettled issues. Awards have often contained specific provisions or
schedules which apply only to particular workplaces, and which are the outcome
of negotiation. In addition, much informal collective bargaining has taken place
outside the arbitration system, resulting in ‘above-award’ pay and conditions
which are legally unenforceable. Under the State systems, it has been traditional
for many industries to be regulated by industry-wide awards, supplemented by
enterprise-specific awards (largely consensual) and informal agreements.
A certified agreement or AWA must not in its overall terms result in the employee
being disadvantaged by comparison with the award. In this regard collective
agreements are subordinate to the minimum standards set by awards, although
the ‘no disadvantage’ test is a global comparison of conditions which allows for
‘trade off’ of award benefits.
96 P. Reith, Second Reading Speech, House of Representatives Weekly Hansard, 23 May 1996, p. 1301;
Workplace Relations Act 1996, ss. 170LQ, 170LO, 170LR, 170LC; Department of Employment
Workplace Relations and Small Business, Agreement making in Australia under the Workplace
Relations Act 1998 and 1999, Canberra, 2000, p. 23.
97 Department of Employment Workplace Relations and Small Business, Agreement making in
Australia under the Workplace Relations Act 2000 and 2001, Canberra, 2002, pp. 95-7.
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IV Regulation of collective labour agreements and freedom 
of parties to contract of employment  
As we have seen, rights under awards and employment contracts are separate and
distinct in nature.98 Award conditions have their legal source and operative effect
in statute and function as independent rights independent of any agreement. A
right or obligation under an award ‘does not depend upon any agreement of the
parties express or implied, and may arise without their knowledge.’99 However,
unless a work relationship is one of employer and employee, which is created by a
contract of employment, an award or other industrial instrument will not apply.100
Because of the separateness of award (or registered collective agreement) and
contract, a party may simultaneously have different rights under both in relation
to the same subject-matter – although if there is a conflict the award provisions
will prevail since they have statutory effect.101
Because of the separate legislative force of an award or certified agreement, parties
cannot validly contract to receive less than their entitlements under such
instruments.102 Nor, because the legislation is for the public benefit, can parties
waive their rights under an award. In the recent Metropolitan Health Case, an
unregistered agreement reached between a hospital employer and a union
allowed nurses to retain their existing positions without risk of transfer to another
hospital, provided they agree to forego annual pay increments to which they were
entitled under an award. In the event, proposed hospital amalgamations did not
take place and so the risk of compulsory transfer did not arise. The nurses
successfully sued to recover their award entitlements which were held not to have
been given up by their consent to the trade-off arrangement under the
unregistered agreement.103
98 True v Amalgamated Collieries of WA Ltd (1939) 62 CLR 451 at 455 (Privy Council); Byrne v
Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 420.
99 Josephson v Walker (1914) 18 CLR 691 at 696 per Griffiths CJ.
100 Amalgamated Collieries of WA Ltd v True (1938) 59 CLR 417 at 423 per Latham CJ.
101 Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 444, explaining True v Amalgamated Collieries
of WA Ltd (1939) 62 CLR 451.
102 The Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) s. 114 specifically states that any contract which purports
to annul or vary an award or industrial agreement is void. In other jurisdictions, any such term
in an agreement would be illegal and unenforceable under contract law principles.
103 Metropolitan Health Service Board v Australian Nursing Federation [2000] FCA 784; 176 ALR 46. Two
judges decided on the basis that it would be unjust to hold the employees to the agreement since
the events on which it was based never transpired, and the employer did not suffer any
detriment. One judge, French J, went further and considered that because an award operates
with statutory force for the public benefit, the employees’ entitlements could not be waived or
estopped: at paras 20–21; 176 ALR at 54. The other judges did not find it necessary to decide this
point.
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At the Federal level and in some States it is now possible for parties to make
individual statutory agreements which ‘contract out’ of award conditions or the
terms of registered collective agreements, but this is by legislative rather than
contractual force. These systems have allowed for registered individual
agreements to prevail over awards and, in some circumstances, collective
agreements. Such agreements prevail by virtue of their statutory force, not
because they are contracts. Under the Western Australian system which existed
from 1993 until recently, an individual workplace agreement overrode an
inconsistent collective agreement, although it still had to provide minimum
employment conditions set by statute.104 This scheme was replaced in 2002 with
one which gives priority to registered industrial agreements, which are collective
in nature. The recent reforms in Western Australia appear to have removed the
ability to sign away rights under an award or collective agreement. Now, an
individual agreement cannot be made while the employee concerned is covered
by an industrial agreement.
During its operation, an Australian Workplace Agreement registered under the
Federal system excludes the terms of any award which would otherwise govern
the employment relationship. The award is effectively suspended for this
period.105 Over the period of its intended operation, an AWA excludes any
certified agreement made after the AWA has come into existence. However an
existing certified agreement prevails over an inconsistent AWA (provided the
certified agreement has not reached its nominal expiry date).106
The other systems do not allow for individual agreements to undercut the terms of
a collective agreement. An individual Queensland Workplace Agreement does not
replace a collective certified agreement unless the collective agreement specifically
allows it to do so.107 The South Australian system provides that enterprise
agreements prevail over both inconsistent awards and employment contracts,
unless the employer and employee specifically agree that a term of the contract
which is more beneficial to the employee will continue.108
Individual parties are usually free to contract for provisions more favourable to
the employee.109 Since most awards set minimum provisions, individual parties
104 Workplace Agreements Act 1993 (WA), s. 10.
105 Workplace Relations Act 1996, s. 170VQ; see Community and Public Sector Union and Employment
National Limited, AIRC Dec 1163/98, Print Q6310, 15 September 1998.
106 Workplace Relations Act 1996, s. 170VQ.
107 Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld), s. 213.
108 Industrial and Employee Relations Act 1994 (SA), s. 81.
109 Kilminster v Sun Newspapers (1931) 46 CLR 284; Wiseman v Professional Radio and Electronics
Institute of Australasia (1978) 20 ALR 545 at 572 per Keely J.
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can usually agree to receive more than the entitlements set under an award. This
would also be the position with a certified agreement, though this would depend
on its wording. An employer would not usually be in breach of an agreement by
paying an employee more than the rate set by the agreement.
V Prospects for collective labour agreements as a means of 
regulation of an employment contract  
In common with other industrialised countries, Australia has shown a shift in the
centre of gravity of collective bargaining, away from a national and industry basis
towards the company level, and a growth in the flexibility of bargaining
processes.110 Associated with this has been a reduced acceptance of collective
bargaining among many employers. The existing systems of industrial relations
legislation in Australia display a strong trend towards individualism in
agreement-making, while facilitating the means for employers to exclude unions
from bargaining. In several disputes in the mining sector, employers have been
able to forestall union attempts to obtain a certified agreement while pursuing a
policy of individualisation by placing as many employees on either individual
workplace agreements or on ‘staff’ employment contracts.111 Employers have been
able to do this largely because the legislation does not require them to engage in
collective bargaining or give priority to such bargaining, and does not give unions
enforceable rights to bargain. Employers are able to choose whether and when to
engage in individual or collective agreements.
Governments have responded to the demand for labour market deregulation by
adopting less centralised forms of agreement-making. Several Australian
jurisdictions have introduced new forms of statutory individual agreement. While
conservative forces promoting such a change have preferred an individual
contract model based on the common law, the historical legacy and public support
for the arbitration system (with its connotations of fairness and impartial scrutiny)
has forced them to adopt a hybrid statutory model. Thus Australian Workplace
Agreements under the Federal system are conceptually contractual in formation,
originating in an informal written agreement between employer and employee.
However they are statutory in their effect, allowing them to override awards and
certified agreements. Like certified agreements, they also require approval by a
110 Alain Supiot, Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe, Oxford,
U.P., 2001, p. 102; Rien Huiskamp, ‘Collective Bargaining in Transition’ in Joris Van Ruysseveldt,
Rien Huiskamp and Jacques van Hoof, eds, Comparative Industrial and Employment Relations,
London, Sage, 1995.
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public authority and conformity to minimum conditions, using awards as the
benchmark. Though statutory in legal force, AWAs are enforceable by essentially
private law remedies (compensatory damages and the injunction to enforce
performance) as well as by penalties in the nature of a fine, which are traditionally
associated with breach of awards.112 Other types of individual agreement
introduced in the last decade under the State systems have been more solidly
contractual in nature, following the approach taken by New Zealand’s (now
repealed) Employment Contracts Act 1991.
The reasons for the shift to individualism are manifold and complex. It is only
partly the result of the decline in trade union membership and influence, although
that has been dramatic. In 1976 Australia had one of the western world’s highest
rates of union membership, with 51 percent of the workforce enrolled. Since then
union density has suffered an increasingly rapid slide, accelerating in the 1990s. In
1990 membership stood at 40.5 percent, but by 2001 only 24.5 percent of
employees were members.113
Research by David Peetz indicates that the decline in unionism is due less to
structural change in the labour market (from the secondary to the service sector)
than the widespread strategic choice by management from the late 1980s to bypass
or oppose collective worker representation. Peetz concludes that nearly three-
quarters of the decline in union density during 1990-95 was due to changes in
employer and state strategies, and that legislative change alone was responsible
for nearly half the decline. In large part this shift was associated with the infusion
of American management attitudes, which was also linked to the philosophical
realignment of the state's attitude towards unions and collectivism in
legislation.114 The introduction of individual agreements is closely associated with
management strategy, reflecting a preference for individualised ‘hard’ HRM
employment relations. It has occurred most strongly at workplaces with a strong
union presence, and is correlated with declining unionism at those workplaces.115
Other forms of collective worker representation have not developed to take the
place of union-based bargaining. Industrial democracy was a brief enthusiasm
111 Matt Moir, ‘Individual and Collective Bargaining in Australian Labour Law: The CRA Weipa
Case’, Sydney Law Review, vol. 18, 1996, pp. 350-371. See also the BHP case discussed in I.4 above.
112 Workplace Relations Act 1996, ss. 170VV, 170VW, 170VZ; Greg McCarry, ‘From Industry to
Enterprise From Award to Agreement: Federal Laws and Workplace Change in Australia’ in
Dennis R. Nolan, ed, The Australiasian Labour Law Reforms, Sydney, Federation Press, 1998, p. 68.
113 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union Membership, August
2001, cat. 6310.0, p. 35.
114 David Peetz, Unions in a Contrary World: The Future of the Australian Trade Union Movement,
Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 97-102.
115 Wooden, The Transformation of Australian Industrial Relations, op. cit., pp. 86, 121.
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during the 1980s under the Federal Labour government, but has been little
realised, apart from occupational health and safety where workplace consultation
is often required under legislation. Attempts to encourage employee participation
through the statutory mechanisms for negotiation of collective agreements have
been unsuccessful.116 There has been little enthusiasm for alternative
representation methods, such as works councils among either employers or
unions, although low-level consultative committees exist in some larger
workplaces.117
The prospects for collective bargaining are significantly affected by the large
component of ‘atypical’ labour in Australia. Part-time employment has accounted
for virtually all the new jobs created in the 1990s. More and more employers are
adopting a ‘low-cost flexibility’ approach to staffing, relying on casual and
contract workers and hiving off responsibility for training. Casual employees now
comprise one-quarter of the Australian workforce. They have little job security
and do not receive annual or sick leave (but earn slightly higher hourly rates).
Casual employees are not in theory excluded from bargaining and can certainly be
covered not only by awards and agreements but (at least for long-term casual
workers) by unfair dismissal legislation. But they have lower rates of unionisation
and participation than permanent employees.118
The ‘outsourcing’ or ‘contracting-out’ of operations may also affect the operation
of collective bargaining, apart from the impact of outsourcing on employee
organisation. If a part of business operations is no longer conducted directly but is
transferred to a new employer, existing collective agreement may no longer apply,
especially where a peripheral or non-core part of a business is outsourced.119
Similarly, if an employer contracts a business to provide ‘overflow’ services to
116 Richard Mitchell, Richard Naughton and Rolf Sorensen, ‘The Law and Employee Participation –
Evidence from the Federal Enterprise Agreements Process’, Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 39,
1997, pp. 196-217;
117 Raymond Markey and Rosemary Reglar, ‘Consultative Commitees in the Australian Steel
Industry’ in Raymond Markey and Jacques Monat, eds, Innovation and Employee Participation
Through Works Councils: International Case Studies, Aldershot, Avebury, 1997; Paul J. Gollan, Ray
Markey and Iain Ross, Additional Forms of Employee Representation in Australia, Australian Centre
for Industrial Relations Research and Training, Working Paper 64, 2001
(www.econ.usyd.edu.au/acirrt/pubs/wp.htm).
118 Australian Centre for Industrial Relations Research and Training, Australia at Work, Sydney,
Prentice-Hall, 1999, pp. 136-9; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Employee Earnings, Benefits and
Trade Union Membership, August 2001, cat. 6310.0.
119 PP Consultants Pty Ltd v Finance Sector Union of Australia (2000) 176 ALR 205 at 209. Under the
Federal labour law system, a new employer acquiring a business as a ‘successor, assignee or
transmittee’ becomes bound by any relevant certified agreement which was binding on the
former employer operating the business, providing the agreement remains relevant to the
business: Workplace Relations Act 1996, s. 170MB.
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supplement its existing operations, the contracting business will most likely not be
bound by the main business’s awards and agreements.120
The legislative changes in the 1990s have produced legal systems which are more
geared towards collective bargaining than previously – but it is bargaining mainly
at the enterprise level and without provision for union recognition or participation
in good faith. Under the Federal system there is no promotion of collective
bargaining in priority to individual agreements. In fact, the legal regimes
introduced by conservative governments have been designed to promote
individualisation and have permitted employers to exclude union bargaining.121
The trend towards statutory promotion of individualism in agreement making has
been halted in the last few years by the election of Labor governments in the
States. Changes of government have meant that the heavily contractualist regimes
which were introduced in the early 1990s have now been replaced by approaches
which are designed to promote collective bargaining. But in many cases it is
collective bargaining without unions. Unions are no longer necessarily involved as
parties, and agreements may be made with an unorganised group of workers,
provided a majority of them consent. This is a very different kind of collective
bargaining from that contemplated under international law or the traditional
compulsory arbitration system. While harmonious and beneficial agreements can
and have been made under this approach, the protection of employees’ freedoms
still ultimately depends on activism on the part of unions and independent
scrutiny by state tribunals. The political polarisation of industrial relations policy
means that whether bargaining is individualist or collectivist in orientation is now
largely dependent on which of the two major parties happens to hold power for
the time being. Undoubtedly, however, the focus of bargaining has shifted
towards the workplace rather than the industry or national level, and in the
process has become less reliant on trade unions.
Changing patterns of work have had a significant impact on traditional forms of
collective representation and bargaining by unions, but employer strategies and
the environment created by legislation have been crucial in the 1990s. In the
absence of strong union representation, employment relations will continue the
trend towards individual agreements (often informal) containing terms dictated
120 See Stellar Call Centres Pty Ltd v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal,
Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia [2001] FCA 106; 103 IR 220.
121 See Stephen Deery and Richard Mitchell, ‘The Emergence of Individualisation and Union
Exclusion as an Employment Relations Strategy’, and Amanda Coulthard, ‘The
Decollectivisation of Australian Industrial Relations: Trade Union Excusion Under the
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)’ in Stephen Deery and Richard Mitchell, eds, Employment
Relations: Individualisation and Union Exclusion – An International Study, Sydney, Federation Press,
1999.
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by the employer, underpinned by increasingly outdated award provisions. The
prospects for the development of truly collective bargaining in Australia will
depend largely on the ability of the trade union movement to revitalise itself at the
workplace level, and this will require the law to promote and legitimise collective
forms of employee representation.
